@article{ErozanWellerFengetal.2020,
  author    = {Ahmet Turan Erozan and Dennis D. Weller and Yijing Feng and Gabriel Cadilha Marques and Jasmin Aghassi-Hagmann and Mehdi Baradaran Tahoori},
  title     = {A Printed Camouflaged Cell against Reverse Engineering of Printed Electronics Circuits},
  series   = {IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems},
  volume    = {28},
  number    = {11},
  organization    = {IEEE},
  issn      = {1063-8210 (Print)},
  doi       = {10.1109/TVLSI.2020.3022776},
  pages     = {2448 -- 2458},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Printed electronics (PE) enables disruptive applications in wearables, smart sensors, and healthcare since it provides mechanical flexibility, low cost, and on-demand fabrication. The progress in PE raises trust issues in the supply chain and vulnerability to reverse engineering (RE) attacks. Recently, RE attacks on PE circuits have been successfully performed, pointing out the need for countermeasures against RE, such as camouflaging. In this article, we propose a printed camouflaged logic cell that can be inserted into PE circuits to thwart RE. The proposed cell is based on three components achieved by changing the fabrication process that exploits the additive manufacturing feature of PE. These components are optically look-alike, while their electrical behaviors are different, functioning as a transistor, short, and open. The properties of the proposed cell and standard PE cells are compared in terms of voltage swing, delay, power consumption, and area. Moreover, the proposed camouflaged cell is fabricated and characterized to prove its functionality. Furthermore, numerous camouflaged components are fabricated, and their (in)distinguishability is assessed to validate their optical similarities based on the recent RE attacks on PE. The results show that the proposed cell is a promising candidate to be utilized in camouflaging PE circuits with negligible overhead.},
  language  = {en}
}