Volltext-Downloads (blau) und Frontdoor-Views (grau)
  • search hit 2 of 3
Back to Result List

A Printed Camouflaged Cell against Reverse Engineering of Printed Electronics Circuits

  • Printed electronics (PE) enables disruptive applications in wearables, smart sensors, and healthcare since it provides mechanical flexibility, low cost, and on-demand fabrication. The progress in PE raises trust issues in the supply chain and vulnerability to reverse engineering (RE) attacks. Recently, RE attacks on PE circuits have been successfully performed, pointing out the need forPrinted electronics (PE) enables disruptive applications in wearables, smart sensors, and healthcare since it provides mechanical flexibility, low cost, and on-demand fabrication. The progress in PE raises trust issues in the supply chain and vulnerability to reverse engineering (RE) attacks. Recently, RE attacks on PE circuits have been successfully performed, pointing out the need for countermeasures against RE, such as camouflaging. In this article, we propose a printed camouflaged logic cell that can be inserted into PE circuits to thwart RE. The proposed cell is based on three components achieved by changing the fabrication process that exploits the additive manufacturing feature of PE. These components are optically look-alike, while their electrical behaviors are different, functioning as a transistor, short, and open. The properties of the proposed cell and standard PE cells are compared in terms of voltage swing, delay, power consumption, and area. Moreover, the proposed camouflaged cell is fabricated and characterized to prove its functionality. Furthermore, numerous camouflaged components are fabricated, and their (in)distinguishability is assessed to validate their optical similarities based on the recent RE attacks on PE. The results show that the proposed cell is a promising candidate to be utilized in camouflaging PE circuits with negligible overhead.show moreshow less

Export metadata

Additional Services

Search Google Scholar

Statistics

frontdoor_oas
Metadaten
Document Type:Article (reviewed)
Zitierlink: https://opus.hs-offenburg.de/4352
Bibliografische Angaben
Title (English):A Printed Camouflaged Cell against Reverse Engineering of Printed Electronics Circuits
Author:Ahmet Turan Erozan, Dennis D. Weller, Yijing Feng, Gabriel Cadilha Marques, Jasmin Aghassi-HagmannStaff MemberORCiDGND, Mehdi Baradaran Tahoori
Year of Publication:2020
Creating Corporation:IEEE
First Page:2448
Last Page:2458
Parent Title (English):IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Volume:28
Issue:11
ISSN:1063-8210 (Print)
ISSN:1557-9999 (Online)
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/TVLSI.2020.3022776
Language:English
Inhaltliche Informationen
Institutes:Fakultät Elektrotechnik, Medizintechnik und Informatik (EMI) (ab 04/2019)
Institutes:Bibliografie
Formale Angaben
Open Access: Closed Access 
Licence (German):License LogoUrheberrechtlich geschützt