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In this work we describe the implementation details of a protocol suite for a secure and reliable over-the-air reprogramming of wireless restricted devices. Although, recently forward error correction codes aiming at a robust transmission over a noisy wireless medium have extensively been discussed and evaluated, we believe that the clear value of the contribution at hand is to share our experience when it comes to a meaningful combination and implementation of various multihop (broadcast) transmission protocols and custom-fit security building blocks: For a robust and reliable data transmission we make use of fountain codes a.k.a. rateless erasure codes and show how to combine such schemes with an underlying medium access control protocol, namely a distributed low duty cycle medium access control (DLDC-MAC). To handle the well known problem of packet pollution of forward-error-correction approaches where an attacker bogusly modifies or infiltrates some minor number of encoded packets and thus pollutes the whole data stream at the receiver side, we apply homomorphic message authentication codes (HomMAC). We discuss implementation details and the pros and cons of the two currently available HomMAC candidates for our setting. Both require as the core cryptographic primitive a symmetric block cipher for which, as we will argue later, we have opted for the PRESENT, PRIDE and PRINCE (exchangeable) ciphers in our implementation.
Extended Performance Measurements of Scalable 6LoWPAN Networks in an Automated Physical Testbed
(2015)
IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks, also known as 6LoWPAN, is becoming more and more a de facto standard for such communications for the Internet of Things, be it in the field of home and building automation, of industrial and process automation, or of smart metering and environmental monitoring. For all of these applications, scalability is a major precondition, as the complexity of the networks continuously increase. To maintain this growing amount of connected nodes a various 6LoWPAN implementations are available. One of the mentioned was developed by the authors' team and was tested on an Automated Physical Testbed for Wireless Systems at the Laboratory Embedded Systems and Communication Electronics of Offenburg University of Applied Sciences, which allows the flexible setup and full control of arbitrary topologies. It also supports time-varying topologies and thus helps to measure performance of the RPL implementation. The results of the measurements prove an excellent stability and a very good short and long-term performance also under dynamic conditions. In all measurements, there is an advantage of minimum 10% with regard to the average times, like global repair time; but the advantage with reagr to average values can reach up to 30%. Moreover, it can be proven that the performance predictions from other papers are consistent with the executed real-life implementations.
We propose secure multi-party computation techniques for the distributed computation of the average using a privacy-preserving extension of gossip algorithms. While recently there has been mainly research on the side of gossip algorithms (GA) for data aggregation itself, to the best of our knowledge, the aforementioned research line does not take into consideration the privacy of the entities involved. More concretely, it is our objective to not reveal a node's private input value to any other node in the network, while still computing the average in a fully-decentralized fashion. Not revealing in our setting means that an attacker gains only minor advantage when guessing a node's private input value. We precisely quantify an attacker's advantage when guessing - as a mean for the level of data privacy leakage of a node's contribution. Our results show that by perturbing the input values of each participating node with pseudo-random noise with appropriate statistical properties (i) only a minor and configurable leakage of private information is revealed, by at the same time (ii) providing a good average approximation at each node. Our approach can be applied to a decentralized prosumer market, in which participants act as energy consumers or producers or both, referred to as prosumers.
Covert and Side-Channels have been known for a long time due to their versatile forms of appearance. For nearly every technical improvement or change in technology, such channels have been (re-)created or known methods have been adapted. For example the introduction of hyperthreading technology has introduced new possibilities for covert communication between malicious processes because they can now share the arithmetic logical unit (ALU) as well as the L1 and L2 cache which enables establishing multiple covert channels. Even virtualization which is known for its isolation of multiple machines is prone to covert and side-channel attacks due to the sharing of resources. Therefore itis not surprising that cloud computing is not immune to this kind of attacks. Even more, cloud computing with multiple, possibly competing users or customers using the same shared resources may elevate the risk of unwanted communication. In such a setting the ”air gap” between physical servers and networks disappears and only the means of isolation and virtual separation serve as a barrier between adversary and victim. In the work at hand we will provide a survey on weak spots an adversary trying to exfiltrate private data from target virtual machines could exploit in a cloud environment. We will evaluate the feasibility of example attacks and point out possible mitigation solutions if they exist.