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The Transport Layer Security protocol is a widespread cryptographic protocol designed to provide secure communication over insecure networks by providing authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality. As a first step, in the TLS Handshake Protocol a common master secret is negotiated. In many configurations, this step makes considerable use of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. It seems to be a prevalent assumption that the use of such asymmetric cryptographic algorithms is unsuitable for resource-constrained devices. Therefore, the work at hand analyzes the runtime performance of the TLS vl.2 session establishments on an embedded ARM Cortex-M4 platform. We measure the execution time to generate and parse session establishment messages for the client and server sides. In particular, we study the impact of different elliptic curves used for the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the impact of different lengths and subject public key algorithms of certification paths. Our analysis shows that the use of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms is well possible on resource-constrained devices, if carefully chosen and well implemented. This allows the use of the well-proven TLS protocol also for applications from the (Industrial) Internet of Things, including Fieldbus communication.
The desire to connect more and more devices and to make them more intelligent and more reliable, is driving the needs for the Internet of Things more than ever. Such IoT edge systems require sound security measures against cyber-attacks, since they are interconnected, spatially distributed, and operational for an extended period of time. One of the most important requirements for the security in many industrial IoT applications is the authentication of the devices. In this paper, we present a mutual authentication protocol based on Physical Unclonable Functions, where challenge-response pairs are used for both device and server authentication. Moreover, a session key can be derived by the protocol in order to secure the communication channel. We show that our protocol is secure against machine learning, replay, man-in-the-middle, cloning, and physical attacks. Moreover, it is shown that the protocol benefits from a smaller computational, communication, storage, and hardware overhead, compared to similar works.
In this paper, we study the runtime performance of symmetric cryptographic algorithms on an embedded ARM Cortex-M4 platform. Symmetric cryptographic algorithms can serve to protect the integrity and optionally, if supported by the algorithm, the confidentiality of data. A broad range of well-established algorithms exists, where the different algorithms typically have different properties and come with different computational complexity. On deeply embedded systems, the overhead imposed by cryptographic operations may be significant. We execute the algorithms AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305, HMAC-SHA256, KMAC, and SipHash on an STM32 embedded microcontroller and benchmark the execution times of the algorithms as a function of the input lengths.