Open Access

It is the purpose of this paper to address ethical issues concerning the development and application of Assistive Technology at Workplaces (ATW). We shall give a concrete technical concept how such technology might be constructed and propose eight technical functions it should adopt in order to serve its purpose. Then, we discuss the normative questions why one should use ATW, and by what means. We argue that ATW is good to the extent that it ensures social inclusion and consider four normative domains in which its worth might consists in. In addition, we insist that ATW must satisfy two requirements of good workplaces, which we specify as (a) an exploitation restraint and (b) a duty of care.

Covert and Side-Channels have been known for a long time due to their versatile forms of appearance. For nearly every technical improvement or change in technology, such channels have been (re-)created or known methods have been adapted. For example the introduction of hyperthreading technology has introduced new possibilities for covert communication between malicious processes because they can now share the arithmetic logical unit (ALU) as well as the L1 and L2 cache which enables establishing multiple covert channels. Even virtualization which is known for its isolation of multiple machines is prone to covert and side-channel attacks due to the sharing of resources. Therefore itis not surprising that cloud computing is not immune to this kind of attacks. Even more, cloud computing with multiple, possibly competing users or customers using the same shared resources may elevate the risk of unwanted communication. In such a setting the ”air gap” between physical servers and networks disappears and only the means of isolation and virtual separation serve as a barrier between adversary and victim. In the work at hand we will provide a survey on weak spots an adversary trying to exfiltrate private data from target virtual machines could exploit in a cloud environment. We will evaluate the feasibility of example attacks and point out possible mitigation solutions if they exist.

Covert channels have been known for a long time because of their versatile forms of appearance. For nearly every technical improvement or change in technology, such channels have been (re-)created or known methods have been adapted. For example, the introduction of hyperthreading technology has introduced new possibilities for covert communication between malicious processes because they can now share the arithmetic logical unit as well as the L1 and L2 caches, which enable establishing multiple covert channels. Even virtualization, which is known for its isolation of multiple machines, is prone to covert- and side-channel attacks because of the sharing of resources. Therefore, it is not surprising that cloud computing is not immune to this kind of attacks. Moreover, cloud computing with multiple, possibly competing users or customers using the same shared resources may elevate the risk of illegitimate communication. In such a setting, the “air gap” between physical servers and networks disappears, and only the means of isolation and virtual separation serve as a barrier between adversary and victim. In the work at hand, we will provide a survey on vulnerable spots that an adversary could exploit trying to exfiltrate private data from target virtual machines through covert channels in a cloud environment. We will evaluate the feasibility of example attacks and point out proposed mitigation solutions in case they exist.

The findings presented in this article were obtained through a preliminary exploratory study conducted at the Offenburg University as part of the Fighting Loneliness project promoted by the institution’s Affective & Cognitive Institute (ACI) from October 2019 to February 2020. The initiative’s main objective was to answer the research question “How should an app be designed to reduce loneliness and social isolation among university students?” with the collaboration of the institution’s students.