Open Access

In this paper, we study the runtime performance of symmetric cryptographic algorithms on an embedded ARM Cortex-M4 platform. Symmetric cryptographic algorithms can serve to protect the integrity and optionally, if supported by the algorithm, the confidentiality of data. A broad range of well-established algorithms exists, where the different algorithms typically have different properties and come with different computational complexity. On deeply embedded systems, the overhead imposed by cryptographic operations may be significant. We execute the algorithms AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305, HMAC-SHA256, KMAC, and SipHash on an STM32 embedded microcontroller and benchmark the execution times of the algorithms as a function of the input lengths.

It seems to be a widespread impression that the use of strong cryptography inevitably imposes a prohibitive burden on industrial communication systems, at least inasmuch as real-time requirements in cyclic fieldbus communications are concerned. AES-GCM is a leading cryptographic algorithm for authenticated encryption, which protects data against disclosure and manipulations. We study the use of both hardware and software-based implementations of AES-GCM. By simulations as well as measurements on an FPGA-based prototype setup we gain and substantiate an important insight: for devices with a 100 Mbps full-duplex link, a single low-footprint AES-GCM hardware engine can deterministically cope with the worst-case computational load, i.e., even if the device maintains a maximum number of cyclic communication relations with individual cryptographic keys. Our results show that hardware support for AES-GCM in industrial fieldbus components may actually be very lightweight.

Cryptographic protection of messages requires frequent updates of the symmetric cipher key used for encryption and decryption, respectively. Protocols of legacy IT security, like TLS, SSH, or MACsec implement rekeying under the assumption that, first, application data exchange is allowed to stall occasionally and, second, dedicated control messages to orchestrate the process can be exchanged. In real-time automation applications, the first is generally prohibitive, while the second may induce problematic traffic patterns on the network. We present a novel seamless rekeying approach, which can be embedded into cyclic application data exchanges. Although, being agnostic to the underlying real-time communication system, we developed a demonstrator emulating the widespread industrial Ethernet system PROFINET IO and successfully use this rekeying mechanism.

We provide a brief overview of the cryptographic security extensions for PROFINET, as defined and specified by PROFIBUS & PROFINET International (PI). These come in three hierarchically defined Security Classes, called Security Class 1,2 and 3. Security Class 1 provides basic security improvements with moderate implementation impact on PROFINET components. Security Classes 2 and 3, in contrast, introduce an integrated cryptographic protection of PROFINET communication. We first highlight and discuss the security features that the PROFINET specification offers for future PROFINET products. Then, as our main focus, we take a closer look at some of the technical challenges that were faced during the conceptualization and design of Security Class 2 and 3 features. In particular, we elaborate on how secure application relations between PROFINET components are established and how a disruption-free availability of a secure communication channel is guaranteed despite the need to refresh cryptographic keys regularly. The authors are members of the PI Working Group CB/PG10 Security.

Driven by the Industry 4.0 paradigm and the resulting demand for connectivity in industrial networking, there is a convergence of formerly isolated operational technology and information technology networks. This convergence leads to attack surfaces on industrial networks. Therefore, a holistic approach of countermeasures is needed to protect against cyber attacks. One element of these countermeasures is the use of certificate-based authentication for industrial components communicating on the field level. This in turn requires the management of certificates, private keys, and trust anchors in the communication endpoints. The work at hand surveys the topic of certificate management in industrial networking environments throughout their life cycle, from manufacturing until their disposal. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is no work yet that surveys the topic of certificate management in industrial networking environments. The work at hand considers contributions from research papers, industrial communication standards, and contributions that originate from the IT domain. In total, 2042 results from IEEE Xplore, Science Direct, Scopus, and Springer Link were taken into account. After applying inclusion and exclusion criteria and title, abstract, and full-text analysis, 20 contributions from research papers were selected. In addition to the presentation of their key contributions, the work at hand provides a synopsis that compares the overarching aspects. This comprises different proposed entity architectures, certificate management functions, involvement of different stakeholders, and consideration of life cycle stages. Finally, research gaps that are to be filled by further work are identified. While the topic of certificate management has already been addressed by the IT domain, its incorporation into industrial communication standards began significantly later and is still the subject of research work.

Security in IT systems, particularly in embedded devices like Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs), has become an important matter of concern as it is the prerequisite for ensuring privacy and safety. Among a multitude of existing security measures, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol family offers mature and standardized means for establishing secure communication channels over insecure transport media. In the context of classical IT infrastructure, its security with regard to protocol and implementation attacks has been subject to extensive research. As TLS protocols find their way into embedded environments, we consider the security and robustness of implementations of these protocols specifically in the light of the peculiarities of embedded systems. We present an approach for systematically checking the security and robustness of such implementations using fuzzing techniques and differential testing. In spite of its origin in testing TLS implementations we expect our approach to likewise be applicable to implementations of other cryptographic protocols with moderate efforts.

The CAN bus still is an important fieldbus in various domains, e.g. for in-car communication or automation applications. To counter security threats and concerns in such scenarios we design, implement, and evaluate the use of an end-to-end security concept based on the Transport Layer Security protocol. It is used to establish authenticated, integrity-checked, and confidential communication channels between field devices connected via CAN. Our performance measurements show that it is possible to use TLS at least for non time-critical applications, as well as for generic embedded networks.