Open Access

Many commonly well-performing convolutional neural network models have shown to be susceptible to input data perturbations, indicating a low model robustness. To reveal model weaknesses, adversarial attacks are specifically optimized to generate small, barely perceivable image perturbations that flip the model prediction. Robustness against attacks can be gained by using adversarial examples during training, which in most cases reduces the measurable model attackability. Unfortunately, this technique can lead to robust overfitting, which results in non-robust models. In this paper, we analyze adversarially trained, robust models in the context of a specific network operation, the downsampling layer, and provide evidence that robust models have learned to downsample more accurately and suffer significantly less from downsampling artifacts, aka. aliasing, than baseline models. In the case of robust overfitting, we observe a strong increase in aliasing and propose a novel early stopping approach based on the measurement of aliasing.

Despite the success of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) in many academic benchmarks for computer vision tasks, their application in the real-world is still facing fundamental challenges. One of these open problems is the inherent lack of robustness, unveiled by the striking effectiveness of adversarial attacks. Current attack methods are able to manipulate the network's prediction by adding specific but small amounts of noise to the input. In turn, adversarial training (AT) aims to achieve robustness against such attacks and ideally a better model generalization ability by including adversarial samples in the trainingset. However, an in-depth analysis of the resulting robust models beyond adversarial robustness is still pending. In this paper, we empirically analyze a variety of adversarially trained models that achieve high robust accuracies when facing state-of-the-art attacks and we show that AT has an interesting side-effect: it leads to models that are significantly less overconfident with their decisions, even on clean data than non-robust models. Further, our analysis of robust models shows that not only AT but also the model's building blocks (like activation functions and pooling) have a strong influence on the models' prediction confidences. Data & Project website: https://github.com/GeJulia/robustness_confidences_evaluation

Despite the success of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) in many academic benchmarks for computer vision tasks, their application in the real-world is still facing fundamental challenges. One of these open problems is the inherent lack of robustness, unveiled by the striking effectiveness of adversarial attacks. Adversarial training (AT) is often considered as a remedy to train more robust networks. In this paper, we empirically analyze a variety of adversarially trained models that achieve high robust accuracies when facing state-of-the-art attacks and we show that AT has an interesting side-effect: it leads to models that are significantly less overconfident with their decisions even on clean data than non-robust models. Further, our analysis of robust models shows that not only AT but also the model's building blocks (like activation functions and pooling) have a strong influence on the models' prediction confidences.

Many commonly well-performing convolutional neural network models have shown to be susceptible to input data perturbations, indicating a low model robustness. Adversarial attacks are thereby specifically optimized to reveal model weaknesses, by generating small, barely perceivable image perturbations that flip the model prediction. Robustness against attacks can be gained for example by using adversarial examples during training, which effectively reduces the measurable model attackability. In contrast, research on analyzing the source of a model’s vulnerability is scarce. In this paper, we analyze adversarially trained, robust models in the context of a specifically suspicious network operation, the downsampling layer, and provide evidence that robust models have learned to downsample more accurately and suffer significantly less from aliasing than baseline models.

Deep generative models have recently achieved impressive results for many real-world applications, successfully generating high-resolution and diverse samples from complex datasets. Due to this improvement, fake digital contents have proliferated growing concern and spreading distrust in image content, leading to an urgent need for automated ways to detect these AI-generated fake images. Despite the fact that many face editing algorithms seem to produce realistic human faces, upon closer examination, they do exhibit artifacts in certain domains which are often hidden to the naked eye. In this work, we present a simple way to detect such fake face images - so-called DeepFakes. Our method is based on a classical frequency domain analysis followed by basic classifier. Compared to previous systems, which need to be fed with large amounts of labeled data, our approach showed very good results using only a few annotated training samples and even achieved good accuracies in fully unsupervised scenarios. For the evaluation on high resolution face images, we combined several public datasets of real and fake faces into a new benchmark: Faces-HQ. Given such high-resolution images, our approach reaches a perfect classification accuracy of 100% when it is trained on as little as 20 annotated samples. In a second experiment, in the evaluation of the medium-resolution images of the CelebA dataset, our method achieves 100% accuracy supervised and 96% in an unsupervised setting. Finally, evaluating a low-resolution video sequences of the FaceForensics++ dataset, our method achieves 91% accuracy detecting manipulated videos.