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In this paper, we study the runtime performance of symmetric cryptographic algorithms on an embedded ARM Cortex-M4 platform. Symmetric cryptographic algorithms can serve to protect the integrity and optionally, if supported by the algorithm, the confidentiality of data. A broad range of well-established algorithms exists, where the different algorithms typically have different properties and come with different computational complexity. On deeply embedded systems, the overhead imposed by cryptographic operations may be significant. We execute the algorithms AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305, HMAC-SHA256, KMAC, and SipHash on an STM32 embedded microcontroller and benchmark the execution times of the algorithms as a function of the input lengths.
Cryptographic protection of messages requires frequent updates of the symmetric cipher key used for encryption and decryption, respectively. Protocols of legacy IT security, like TLS, SSH, or MACsec implement rekeying under the assumption that, first, application data exchange is allowed to stall occasionally and, second, dedicated control messages to orchestrate the process can be exchanged. In real-time automation applications, the first is generally prohibitive, while the second may induce problematic traffic patterns on the network. We present a novel seamless rekeying approach, which can be embedded into cyclic application data exchanges. Although, being agnostic to the underlying real-time communication system, we developed a demonstrator emulating the widespread industrial Ethernet system PROFINET IO and successfully use this rekeying mechanism.
Towards a Formal Verification of Seamless Cryptographic Rekeying in Real-Time Communication Systems
(2022)
This paper makes two contributions to the verification of communication protocols by transition systems. Firstly, the paper presents a modeling of a cyclic communication protocol using a synchronized network of transition systems. This protocol enables seamless cryptographic rekeying embedded into cyclic messages. Secondly, we test the protocol using the model checking verification technique.
Die Vielfalt der Protokolle, die praktisch auf allen Ebenen der Netzwerkkommunikation zu berücksichtigen ist, stellt eine der großen Herausforderungen bei der fortschreitenden Automatisierung des intelligenten Hauses dar. Unter dem Überbegriff Internet der Dinge (Internet of Things) entstehen gegenwärtig zahlreiche neue Entwicklungen, Standards, Allianzen und so genannte Ökosysteme. Diese haben die Absicht einer horizontalen Integration gewerkeübergreifender Anwendungen und verfolgen fast alle das Ziel, die Situation zu vereinfachen, die Entwicklungen zu beschleunigen und Markterfolge zu erreichen. Leider macht diese Vielfalt momentan die Welt aber eher noch komplexer und bringt damit das Risiko mit sich, genau das Gegenteil der ursprünglichen Absichten zu erreichen. Dieser Beitrag versucht, die Entwicklungen möglichst systematisch zu kategorisieren und mögliche Lösungsansätze zu beschreiben.
Real-Time Ethernet has become the major communication technology for modern automation and industrial control systems. On the one hand, this trend increases the need for an automation-friendly security solution, as such networks can no longer be considered sufficiently isolated. On the other hand, it shows that, despite diverging requirements, the domain of Operational Technology (OT) can derive advantage from high-volume technology of the Information Technology (IT) domain. Based on these two sides of the same coin, we study the challenges and prospects of approaches to communication security in real-time Ethernet automation systems. In order to capitalize the expertise aggregated in decades of research and development, we put a special focus on the reuse of well-established security technology from the IT domain. We argue that enhancing such technology to become automation-friendly is likely to result in more robust and secure designs than greenfield designs. Because of its widespread deployment and the (to this date) nonexistence of a consistent security architecture, we use PROFINET as a showcase of our considerations. Security requirements for this technology are defined and different well-known solutions are examined according their suitability for PROFINET. Based on these findings, we elaborate the necessary adaptions for the deployment on PROFINET.
An international study summarizes the threat situation in the OT environment under the heading "Growing security threats" [1]. According to this study, attacks on automation systems are likely to increase in the future. Accordingly, an automation system must be able to protect the integrity of the transmitted information in the future. This requirement is motivated, among other things, by the fact that the network-side isolation of industrial communication systems is no longer considered sufficient as the sole protective measure. This paper uses the example of PROFINET to show how the future requirements for a real-time communication protocol can be met and how they can be derived from the IEC 62443 standard.
As cyber-attacks and functional safety requirements increase in Operational Technology (OT), implementing security measures becomes crucial. The IEC/IEEE 60802 draft standard addresses the security convergence in Time-Sensitive Networks (TSN) for industrial automation.We present the standard’s security architecture and its goals to establish end-to-end security with resource access authorization in OT systems. We compare the standard to our abstract technology-independent model for the management of cryptographic credentials during the lifecycles of OT systems. Additionally, we implemented the processes, mechanisms, and protocols needed for IEC/IEEE 60802 and extended the architecture with public key infrastructure (PKI) functionalities to support complete security management processes.
eTPL: An Enhanced Version of the TLS Presentation Language Suitable for Automated Parser Generation
(2017)
The specification of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol defines its own presentation language used for the purpose of semi-formally describing the structure and on-the-wire format of TLS protocol messages. This TLS Presentation Language (TPL) is more expressive and concise than natural language or tabular descriptions, but as a result of its limited objective has a number of deficiencies. We present eTPL, an enhanced version of TPL that improves its expressiveness, flexibility, and applicability to non-TLS scenarios. We first define a generic model that describes the parsing of binary data. Based on this, we propose language constructs for TPL that capture important information which would otherwise have to be picked manually from informal protocol descriptions. Finally, we briefly introduce our software tool etpl-tool which reads eTPL definitions and automatically generates corresponding message parsers in C++. We see our work as a contribution supporting sniffing, debugging, and rapid-prototyping of wired and wireless communication systems.