Refine
Year of publication
- 2015 (15) (remove)
Document Type
- Conference Proceeding (13)
- Article (reviewed) (2)
Conference Type
- Konferenzartikel (13)
Language
- English (15)
Is part of the Bibliography
- yes (15) (remove)
Keywords
- Eingebettetes System (3)
- Kommunikation (3)
- Applikation (2)
- Cascading Style Sheets (1)
- Datenmanagement (1)
- Dienstleistung (1)
- Energieverbrauch (1)
- Funktechnik (1)
- Implementation (1)
- Informationstechnik (1)
Institute
- ivESK - Institut für verlässliche Embedded Systems und Kommunikationselektronik (15) (remove)
Open Access
- Closed Access (8)
- Open Access (4)
- Bronze (1)
We provide a privacy-friendly cloud-based smart metering storage architecture which provides few-instance storage on encrypted measurements by at the same time allowing SQL queries on them. Our approach is most flexible with respect to two axes: on the one hand it allows to apply filtering rules on encrypted data with respect to various upcoming business cases; on the other hand it provides means for a storage-efficient handling of encrypted measurements by applying server-side deduplication techniques over all incoming smart meter measurements. Although the work at hand is purely dedicated to a smart metering architecture we believe our approach to have value for a broader class of IoT cloud storage solutions. Moreover, it is an example for Privacy-by-design supporting the positive-sum paradigm.
The Metering Bus, also known as M-Bus, is a European standard EN13757-3 for reading out metering devices, like electricity, water, gas, or heat meters. Although real-life M-Bus networks can reach a significant size and complexity, only very simple protocol analyzers are available to observe and maintain such networks. In order to provide developers and installers with the ability to analyze the real bus signals easily, a web-based monitoring tool for the M-Bus has been designed and implemented. Combined with a physical bus interface it allows for measuring and recording the bus signals. For this at first a circuit has been developed, which transforms the voltage and current-modulated M-Bus signals to a voltage signal that can be read by a standard ADC and processed by an MCU. The bus signals and packets are displayed using a web server, which analyzes and classifies the frame fragments. As an additional feature an oscilloscope functionality is included in order to visualize the physical signal on the bus. This paper describes the development of the read-out circuit for the Wired M-Bus and the data recovery.
6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low Power Wireless Personal Area Networks) is gaining more and more attraction for the seamless connectivity of embedded devices for the Internet of Things (IoT). Whereas the lower layers (IEEE802.15.4 and 6LoWPAN) are already well defined and consolidated with regard to frame formats, header compression, routing protocols and commissioning procedures, there is still an abundant choice of possibilities on the application layer. Currently, various groups are working towards standardization of the application layer, i.e. the ETSI Technical Committee on M2M, the IP for Smart Objects (IPSO) Alliance, Lightweight M2M (LWM2M) protocol of the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA), and OneM2M. This multitude of approaches leaves the system developer with the agony of choice. This paper selects, presents and explains one of the promising solutions, discusses its strengths and weaknesses, and demonstrates its implementation.
Covert and Side-Channels have been known for a long time due to their versatile forms of appearance. For nearly every technical improvement or change in technology, such channels have been (re-)created or known methods have been adapted. For example the introduction of hyperthreading technology has introduced new possibilities for covert communication between malicious processes because they can now share the arithmetic logical unit (ALU) as well as the L1 and L2 cache which enables establishing multiple covert channels. Even virtualization which is known for its isolation of multiple machines is prone to covert and side-channel attacks due to the sharing of resources. Therefore itis not surprising that cloud computing is not immune to this kind of attacks. Even more, cloud computing with multiple, possibly competing users or customers using the same shared resources may elevate the risk of unwanted communication. In such a setting the ”air gap” between physical servers and networks disappears and only the means of isolation and virtual separation serve as a barrier between adversary and victim. In the work at hand we will provide a survey on weak spots an adversary trying to exfiltrate private data from target virtual machines could exploit in a cloud environment. We will evaluate the feasibility of example attacks and point out possible mitigation solutions if they exist.