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The Metering Bus, also known as M-Bus, is a European standard EN13757-3 for reading out metering devices, like electricity, water, gas, or heat meters. Although real-life M-Bus networks can reach a significant size and complexity, only very simple protocol analyzers are available to observe and maintain such networks. In order to provide developers and installers with the ability to analyze the real bus signals easily, a web-based monitoring tool for the M-Bus has been designed and implemented. Combined with a physical bus interface it allows for measuring and recording the bus signals. For this at first a circuit has been developed, which transforms the voltage and current-modulated M-Bus signals to a voltage signal that can be read by a standard ADC and processed by an MCU. The bus signals and packets are displayed using a web server, which analyzes and classifies the frame fragments. As an additional feature an oscilloscope functionality is included in order to visualize the physical signal on the bus. This paper describes the development of the read-out circuit for the Wired M-Bus and the data recovery.
Security in IT systems, particularly in embedded devices like Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs), has become an important matter of concern as it is the prerequisite for ensuring privacy and safety. Among a multitude of existing security measures, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol family offers mature and standardized means for establishing secure communication channels over insecure transport media. In the context of classical IT infrastructure, its security with regard to protocol and implementation attacks has been subject to extensive research. As TLS protocols find their way into embedded environments, we consider the security and robustness of implementations of these protocols specifically in the light of the peculiarities of embedded systems. We present an approach for systematically checking the security and robustness of such implementations using fuzzing techniques and differential testing. In spite of its origin in testing TLS implementations we expect our approach to likewise be applicable to implementations of other cryptographic protocols with moderate efforts.