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Novel manufacturing technologies, such as printed electronics, may enable future applications for the Internet of Everything like large-area sensor devices, disposable security, and identification tags. Printed physically unclonable functions (PUFs) are promising candidates to be embedded as hardware security keys into lightweight identification devices. We investigate hybrid PUFs based on a printed PUF core. The statistics on the intra- and inter-hamming distance distributions indicate a performance suitable for identification purposes. Our evaluations are based on statistical simulations of the PUF core circuit and the thereof generated challenge-response pairs. The analysis shows that hardware-intrinsic security features can be realized with printed lightweight devices.
Hybrid low-voltage physical unclonable function based on inkjet-printed metal-oxide transistors
(2020)
Modern society is striving for digital connectivity that demands information security. As an emerging technology, printed electronics is a key enabler for novel device types with free form factors, customizability, and the potential for large-area fabrication while being seamlessly integrated into our everyday environment. At present, information security is mainly based on software algorithms that use pseudo random numbers. In this regard, hardware-intrinsic security primitives, such as physical unclonable functions, are very promising to provide inherent security features comparable to biometrical data. Device-specific, random intrinsic variations are exploited to generate unique secure identifiers. Here, we introduce a hybrid physical unclonable function, combining silicon and printed electronics technologies, based on metal oxide thin film devices. Our system exploits the inherent randomness of printed materials due to surface roughness, film morphology and the resulting electrical characteristics. The security primitive provides high intrinsic variation, is non-volatile, scalable and exhibits nearly ideal uniqueness.
The status quo of PROFINET, a commonly used industrial Ethernet standard, provides no inherent security in its communication protocols. In this thesis an approach for protecting real-time PROFINET RTC messages against spoofing, tampering and optionally information disclosure is specified and implemented into a real-world prototype setup. Therefor authenticated encryption is used, which relies on symmetric cipher schemes. In addition a procedure to update the used symmetric encryption key in a bumpless manner, e.g. without interrupting the real-time communication, is introduced and realized.
The concept for protecting the PROFINET RTC messages was developed in collaboration with a task group within the security working group of PROFINET International. The author of this thesis has also been part of that task group. This thesis contributes by proofing the practicability of the concept in a real-world prototype setup, which consists of three FPGA-based development boards that communicate with each other to showcase bumpless key updates.
To enable a bumpless key update without disturbing the deterministic real-time traffic by dedicated messages, the key update annunciation and status is embedded into the header. By provisioning two key slots, of which only one is in used, while the other is being prepared, a well-synchronized coordinated switch between the receiver and the sender performs the key update.
The developed prototype setup allows to test the concept and builds the foundation for further research and implementation activities, e.g. the impact of cryptographic operations onto the processing time.
Wireless synchronization of industrial controllers is a challenging task in environments where wired solutions are not practical. The best solutions proposed so far to solve this problem require pretty expensive and highly specialized FPGA-based devices. With this work we counter the trend by introducing a straightforward approach to synchronize a fairly cheap IEEE 802.11 integrated wireless chip (IWC) with external devices. More specifically we demonstrate how we can reprogram the software running in the 802.11 IWC of the Raspberry Pi 3B and transform the receiver input potential of the wireless transceiver into a triggering signal for an external inexpensive FPGA. Experimental results show a mean-square synchronization error of less than 496 ns, while the absolute synchronization error does not exceed 6 μs. The jitter of the output signal that we obtain after synchronizing the clock of the external device did not exceed 5.2 μs throughout the whole measurement campaign. Even though we do not score new records in term of accuracy, we do in terms of complexity, cost, and availability of the required components: all these factors make the proposed technique a very promising of the deployment of large-scale low-cost automation solutions.
Embedded Analog Physical Unclonable Function System to Extract Reliable and Unique Security Keys
(2020)
Internet of Things (IoT) enabled devices have become more and more pervasive in our everyday lives. Examples include wearables transmitting and processing personal data and smart labels interacting with customers. Due to the sensitive data involved, these devices need to be protected against attackers. In this context, hardware-based security primitives such as Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) provide a powerful solution to secure interconnected devices. The main benefit of PUFs, in combination with traditional cryptographic methods, is that security keys are derived from the random intrinsic variations of the underlying core circuit. In this work, we present a holistic analog-based PUF evaluation platform, enabling direct access to a scalable design that can be customized to fit the application requirements in terms of the number of required keys and bit width. The proposed platform covers the full software and hardware implementations and allows for tracing the PUF response generation from the digital level back to the internal analog voltages that are directly involved in the response generation procedure. Our analysis is based on 30 fabricated PUF cores that we evaluated in terms of PUF security metrics and bit errors for various temperatures and biases. With an average reliability of 99.20% and a uniqueness of 48.84%, the proposed system shows values close to ideal.