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In recent years, light-weight cryptography has received a lot of attention. Many primitives suitable for resource-restricted hardware platforms have been proposed. In this paper, we present a cryptanalysis of the new stream cipher A2U2 presented at IEEE RFID 2011 [9] that has a key length of 56 bit. We start by disproving and then repairing an extremely efficient attack presented by Chai et al. [8], showing that A2U2 can be broken in less than a second in the chosen-plaintext case. We then turn our attention to the more challenging known-plaintext case and propose a number of attacks. A guess-and-determine approach combined with algebraic cryptanalysis yields an attack that requires about 249 internal guesses. We also show how to determine the 5-bit counter key and how to reconstruct the 56-bit key in about 238 steps if the attacker can freely choose the IV. Furthermore, we investigate the possibility of exploiting the knowledge of a “noisy keystream” by solving a Max-PoSSo problem. We conclude that the cipher needs to be repaired and point out a number of simple measures that would prevent the above attacks.
In the year 2009 several data privacy scandals have hit the headlines where major corporations had a legitimate need for detecting fraud conducted by their own employees, but chose inappropriate measures for data screening. This contribution presents architectures and pseudonymization technology for privacy compliant fraud screening or fraud detection, in order to reduce the number of undiscovered fraud cases and to reduce the time to discovery.